>> you can watch this and other programmed online. >> next, jeffrey engel talks about his book "into the desert" and looks back on the impact of the 1990 '91 gulf war. it's an hour and 20. >> dr. jeffrey a. engel is the founding director of the presidential history project at southern methodist university. until the summer of 2012, he served as the class of 52 founders professor at texas a&m university. so, we're pleased the cruisies are here as well. thank you for the support you have given to jeff engel and to

the bush school and texas a&m. when jeff was here at texas a&m, he was the director of programming for the scrocroft institute and is a graduate of cornell university. he additionally studied ate st. katherine's college, oxford university and received his ph.d in american history from the university of wisconsin in madison and serve as an owen post doctoral fellow in international security, studied at yale university. his books include, cold war, at noun feet. the anglo american fight for aviation supremacy. he received a pretty significant award for that book. he won the prize from the american historical, so i for this outstanding work in history. he wrote local consequences of the global cold war. published by stanford university

press in 2008. and the china die a of george h.w. bush, the making of a global president, published by princeton university press in 2008. rethinking leadership and whole of government national security reform, with one of our bush school faculty members, joe serami, and that was done for the strategic studies institute in 2010, and wrote the fall of the berlin wall, the revolutionary legacy of 1989, published by oxford university press in 2009. obviously we miss him at the bush school but know he is doing well at smu. i would now like to suggest that we're going to have a preintroduction to dr. jeff engel coming up on stage, and before he brings his remarks we're going to see a video, and this is a pretty significant video because it's a video in president bush's own words and it chronicles the event

following the invasion of kuwait, and i would like to now pay attention to this video and after it's over, we'll have jeff engel come up and talk to us. thank you very much. [applause] >> in the early morning hours of august 2nd, following negotiations and promises by iraq's dictator, hussein, not to use force, a powerful iraqi army invade it its trusting and much weaker neighbor, kuwait. within three days, 120,000 iraqi troops, with 850 tanks, had poured into kuwait and moved south to threaten saudi arabia.

at my direction, elements of the 82nd airborne division, as well as key corrupt of the united states air force, are arriving today to take up defensive positions in saudi arabia. no one, friend or foe, should doubt or desire for peace, and no one should underestimate our determination to confront aggression. >> our objectives in the persian gulf are clear. our goals defined. and familiar. iraq must withdraw from kuwait completely immediately, and without condition. [applause] >> these goals are not ours alone. they've been endorsed by the united nations security council five times in as many weeks. most countries share our concern

for principle, and many have a stake in the stability of the persian gulf. this is not, as saddam hussein would have it, the united states against iraq. it is iraq against the world. >> may i say that i just had a very useful meeting with his highness, the amir, and i -- -- we a greed on the decyberrability that our objectives do-and we agreed that all options remained open and that steps needed to be taken right now. [cheering] >> over the past four months,

you have launched what history will judge as one of the most important deployments of allied military power since 1945. and i have come here today to personally thank you. the world is watching. >> i have spoken with the secretary of state, jim baker, who reported to me on his nearly seven hours of conversations with the iraqi foreign minister. secretary baker method it clear that he discerned no evidence whatsoever that iraq was willing to comply with the international community's demand to withdraw from kuwait and comply with the ud nations resolutions. let me emphasizes that i have

not given up on a peaceful outcome. it's not too late. the choice of peace or war is really saddam hussein's to make. >> just two hours ago allied air most began attacks on military targets in iraq good kuwait. these attacks continue as i speak. ground forces are not engaged.

♪ >> israel is not a participant. israel is not a combatant, and this man i elected to launch a terroristic attack. >> when the soviet union made such a strong statement, that was very reassuring and we're in close touch with our coalition partners and this coalition is not going to fall apart. >> now with remarkable technological advances like the patriot missile, we can defend against ballistic missile attacks aimed at innocent civilians. >> i have therefore directed general norman schwarzkopf in conjunction with coalition forces to use all forces

available including ground forces, to eject the iraqi army from kuwait. the liberation of watt has now entered a final phase. i have complete confidence in the ability of the coalition forces, swiftly and decisively, to accomplish their mission. >> kuwait is liberated. iraq is defeated. our military objectives are met. kuwait is once more in the hands of kuwaitis, in control of their own destiny. we share in your joy, joy temp elerred only by our compassion for their ordeal.

we went halfway around the world to do what is moral and just and right. we fought hard, and with others we won the war. we lifted the yoke of address and tyranny of a small country that many american had never heard of and we asked nothing in return. we're coming home now, proud, confident, heads high. there is much that we must too. at home and abroad, and we will do it. we are americans. may god bless this great nation, the united states of america. thank you all very much. [applause] ♪

>> dr. jeffrey engel. [applause] >> howdy. >> howdy. >> i got to tell you, i miss a lot of things about aggie land. it's been two years since i've been back. i miss the students itch in miss the barbecue, i miss the football. i really miss a howdy. this miss first visit back to the bush school in two and a half years and it's hard not to feel completely overwhelmed by

the memories. in every possible way, the bush school provided a home. our kids were born here in college station, and it will forever be part of our lives and our history. and in fact in my mind, the school gave me nothing less than a career as well. it also provided, i should say, wonderful colleagues. ever eager to debate ideas while training the next generation of public servants. now i should note that several of my favorite colleagues were also trying to explain to me in great detail, often times with charts and graphs and long equations, exactly why my own methodology were deficient. i wish professor green was here, and these debates sharpen our arguments and prove the value of good colleagues because the best kind of colleagues are those who

care enough argue with you to help you get it right. so i thank my colleagues especially for my time here. deep personal relationships define our time here in aggie lan. i think back on all the deans and administrators for the bush school as i grew. chuck herman, who called me on a saturday night to offer me a job, and to the general who, upon hearing what it would take too brain couple of yankee historians down to texas said, simply, and i hear quote, hoowah. he then hung up the phone, leaving me to won what he meant, and more importantly, if he would call back. he did and he came through, as did other deans to follow, including benton coken, and ryan crocker who epitomizes public

service. and then there's andy court. let me say a quick word about andy, since i have the mic. the bush school is deeply and profoundly fortunate to have andy cart at the helm. we only overlapped briefly but i discovered the man who more than any other than i had meat in my life and career, a man with great power, great intellect, and great substance, who was also a truly great gentleman. so you're lucky. actually come to think of it, there is one other person who combines a great sense of power and leadership with being a true gentleman and the entire school is named after him. but i realize you did not come here tonight to go down memory lane. we come here instead to launch a book, fruit of the scrocroft

institute's research program that explores a variety of interpretations and analyses of the gulf war,. the book began as part of the school's 20th commemoration of the gulf war, and under larry's excellent leadership, his scowcroft institute gathered together eminent scholars, policy-makers, journalis, charging each with providing their own unique perspective on the gulf war. not only what it went to them and what it meant went the longer arc of history. they talked about politics. military affairs, diplomacy, relations between the muslims and the western world, and ultimately what that all meant for the time and for the future. now, i admit to you here i'm quite biased but i think this is that rare collection of essays that is more than just the sum of it parts.

thees says actually speech to each other at types actually disagreeing with each other, and giving a book launch talk about the collection is no easy thing because each contributor tell their own story and make they're own argument far better than i could. so therefore tonight i'm going to spend the remainder of my time giving you my perspective on the gulf war. it's been 20 some years, and much has changed over that time, yet much remains the same. saddam hussein, of course, is gone, and kuwait remains independent. yet american forces remain enmeshed in the persian gulf and the broader middle east far more now in 2013, than at any time before the historic events of 1990 and '91. among the things that have changed since 1991, includes, of course, our memories of the gulf

war and our sense of what it meant and this is the underlying point of the entire book. what the gulf war means to us, 20 years -- 20 plus years later is not necessarily what it meant at the time. and not what it will mean to people 20 years in the future and beyond. perhaps the greatest historian, herbert butterfield, told us more than 80 years ago can we dish historians and the general public -- we all, by the way of our memories work, ten recall the past not in terms of what actually happened but how things turn out. we tend to focus on what things meant to us, not what things meant to people at the time. therefore, we can say quite quickly that the gulf war was a conflict that was roundly understood, as least in american circles-as a tremendous victory in 1991. that interpretation changed a tad bit over the 1990s when it was considered a victory, yes,

but perhaps an inconclusive victory, given that saddam hussein still remained in power, and of course the conflict took on new meaning after 9/11 when it was perceived in many circles as the first falling domino in a series of unexpected events. but none of these interpretations that came after that fact, after that time, truly capture what it meant to be at that time. the sense of anxiety. the sense of fear. the sense of moving into uncharted new territory and how that adventure might turn out. or how badly. such notion0s uncertainty underlie each of the the major points i wish to make tonight. as we recall the gulf war and ponder its meaning. the opinions are these. first, that the gulf war was a fundmentally transformative moment for the american engagement in the crucial yet volatile middle east. even before august 1990, the persian gulf was largely beyond

washington's direct sphere of influence. it was an important region but not yet one that the united states was the primary player. after 1990-'91, i argue that the united states became essentially another gulf state and became the largest actor of all in the regions all because of events that flowed from the decisions made in 1990 and '91. my second point is that the gulf war indeed not have been waged at all. now, let me be clear on this point. lest you think i'm a conspiracy theorist. when i do not argue iraq could have been deterred from assaulting its neighbor in 1990. this is a popular interpretation, the i think facts prove to be wholly wrong. neither die argue the gulf war need not have been fight. but an occupied kuwait could have been liberated without the use of force.

rather, i argue tonight that each of washington's primary decisions at this time, the decisions to confront iraq with military force, the decision to liberate kuwait with military force, the decision to defend saudi arabiaa with military force, the decision to initiate military operations even as bad guys desperately south a way out of the surprise the decision to halt combat operations are the liberation of kuwait but before the total detrucks of the iraqi army, each of these were decisions. they didn't just happen. we know how they turn out but they were choices made at the time. and the bush administration could have made different choices. and my third point elaborates on the first two. that american policy-makers did not fight by reflex. there had to have been a reason that george bush, a fundamentally cautious policymaker for whom the word

prudent wasn't just a catch phrase but a way of life when he considered the international system there had to be a reason why this cautious policymake we're risk the lives of so many and also risk his entire presidency to do something to audacious and utterly unprecedented, and there were reasons indeed. his white house and he and the united states in turn did not fight because it was antiarab, proisrael, or simply interested in the region's oil. though these have been frequent criticisms for the last 20 years. these were popular interpretations but they're wrong. i contend the real reason why george bush waged the gulf war and the way he did was more profound. he went to war like so many presidents before him in search of a better world. and my point there, therefore is nothing less than that the gulf war marked a fundamental turning point, pivot point, in mod term

american history. all that came before 1991, after 1945, you can understand in terms of the cold war, but all that happened afterwards was something else entirely. three points, then. that the gulf was transformative. that it was contingent and that it formed a clear dividing point in history. so let me turn the first point. which begins immediately after iraqi forces invaded kuwait in august of 1990. when considering the gulf were we need recall that washington could simply have let hussein's aggression go. it could have done nothing, as kuwait was swallowed up by its neighbor. in fact many experts, including we now know within bush's inner circle, initially argued for just that position. some argued in fact that the united states had no real allies in the region, only interests, and chief among those interests was ensuring the flow of gulf

oil the world. kuwait was no democracy and neither were its neighbors. this war not american allies because of ideology but because they shared something in common. in 1990 the middle east mattered in global politics because of its oil. the world cared before the the gulf because it had oil and gulf states tolerated international interference thiara -- in their affairs because the foreigners bought the oil. and husband -- saddam hussein loved this arrangement and he wanted to sell more oil to the world. more than this opec partners could condone. saddam in 1990 had tremendous debts, archly as a rut of its ten year war with his neighbor iran. his neighbors, the kuwaitis, enjoyed years of unbridled profits at the same time.

and saddam hussein did not innovate kuwait to keep its oil from the world. on the contrary, he watched to sell it to the world. he wanted to sell his oil and kuwait's to pay off the debts, and the geo political reality thefts situation prompted many in washington, including in bush's own inner cabinet to respond with essentially stud yesterday indifference to the news that iraq had invaded kuwait. now, they surely cared it happened. they just didn't know how much they should really care. who cared? it was argued within the national security council, which flag was stamped on a barrel of oil that came out of the gulf so long as is came out of the gulf. so long as the great middle eastern gas station was open for business, the americans in the world could hold their nose and let the matter go away. other options exited for how the world might deal with the iraqi aggression. washington could have accepted a so-called arab solution, allowing regional players to solve the crisis without

international interference. in fact egypt's hosni mubarak and jordan's king hussein each lobbied president bush over the tell foal before are during and after the iraqi invasion to allow the arab world to solve this problem on their own. we know this man, mubarak told bush. the arabs have different rules, different wide acting other than president bush or other american leaders or other western leaders might approve of. mubarak and king hussein told bush time and time again, let us handle this. we need to take care of our own. bush agreed to let his friends give it a try for a world. he told them they could try for a negotiating evidence deal. programs even one that would have led to reduction in kuwait sovereignty even as he instructed his own staff to seek further openings, and there were in fact further options beyond

the military course which, of course, we'll turn to in due course. perhaps the united states could have focused on economic sanctions to drive iraq from kuwait. this is a positive approach in continental europe. or perhaps bush could limit it to an air campaign. this is something that gorbachev lob yesterday bush to do. but george bush was not the only decision-maker in the world confronted by this problem. for gorbachev could have threatened to counter american fore in the middle east with his own. threatening that which has happen repeat lid during the cold war in 1956 in 1973, again in the mid-1980s, soviet leaders warned the united states against putting too much of their own interests in the persian gulf. now, let's admit soviet intend venges was unlikely in august of

1990, given soviet poverty and the need of gorbachev in tech to keep good relations with the west and with george bush. but to say it was unlikely was not the same to say it was impossible. for iraq was a long-time client state of the soviet and had advocates throughout moscow and the kremlin. more importantly, one cold war dynamic had been that each summer power was wary of the other gaining too much influence over the crucial oil region of the persian gulf and had that baghdad invaded kuwait five years earlier, back in 1985, back in the era when gorbachev had not yet been known in the west, when perestroika were terms unknown and two years after ronald reagan referred to the soviets as the evil empire, had saddam innovated at that -- invade it it would have been a bigger crisis. the soviets would never have allowed the united states to put more than half a million troops

and arms along the persian gulf. yet none of these options came to pass. not apiecement, not economic sanction. not a renewal of colored war tension0s even the arab solution. for the fundamental reason that george bush believed, or, rather, came to believe, that there was far more at stake than merely kuwait. to fully appreciate the moment in history, think we must recognize that washington's engagement with the gulf looked far different in 1991 and '90 than it does today. before 1990, american warships routinely patrolled gulf waters but had little presence on the ground falling the iranian revolution of 1979 and the pullout from lebanon a few years later. washington held a limited defense agreement with bahrain but no one else else. there were no u.s. troops in saudi arabia in 1990, nor any formal pledge to defend that

kingdom or kuwait. in fact on the eve of the iraqi invasion, as tensions in the region grew, american policymakers put to each of the gulf states the idea that perhaps this would be a good time for a joint military exercise, let's show saddam we're in this together of all the gulf states, only one, the united arab emirates, agreed to this limited demonstration of solidarity. they feared more than saddam, public backlash from cavorting with what was routinely called the great satan and as saddam hussein directly told the united states ambassador before the invasion, quote, he felt secure, secure in the belief that no arab government would ever allow the united states to use their lands for that purpose. defending kuwait. now, why was he so secure in this belief? well, two reasons. first, because of his view, muslim states would reject the

american troops on their soil and because none to date had ever done sin since 199. the shah of iran had but that was not a model arab leaders wish to followed. ...

>> latter part of 1989 that laid out the full scope of the region. this document does not use the word freedom, does not use the word democracy it is said talked-about regime types or radical islam instead accidents -- access to persian gulf will and is

vital to national security interest. period. and this context matters to do more with hussain did not threaten the destruction of oil for those in american politics with a long-term history. at this point* advised presidents for years the more closest friends and upon hearing this news contemplating give back to washington and told the president, pulled him into the office and close the door and said "i know you're aware of the fact this has

all the ingredients that has brought down three of the last five presidents, hostage crisis, by the banks and a full-fledged economic recession caused by $40 oil quote. it was hardly embraced across the board at the same time the congressional opposition it was conducted at of the true sense of concern. the senate majority leader the risk of active american intervention was great they include the and known number of casualties of greatly disrupted oil supply widened to israel or turkey or possible -- a rare -- occupation of iraq long

lasting in the sea and return to american isolationism. looking back at those warnings some ochered in the immediate aftermath but billions of dollars lost still with isolationism these and similar fears when then national security council met to discuss iraq's invasion moreover national security advisor brent scowcroft but my fellow contributor also a purchase event, the memoirs "a sharp disappointment. what schoolcraft found appealing is in many of

bush's visors except the conquest. bush urged to.there saudi arabia of vital american national security interests but argued kuwait was not. 50 need is not described as a pacifist in defense of american interest he simply does not see it at stake. they did not seem to mind too much the prospect of hussain coming in to control of one-third of the oil supply but if fact will raising oil prices back to the days of the early '70s that it might actually be good for consumers. the most significant warning

harkened back to the anxieties he warned them the soviets may react badly if they do anything to my rack and then said not to overlook the soviet desire in other words, he thought his new friend that in the first hours and-- of the iraqi invasion mrs. not with the image of the decisive image recalled by members of the gulf war. calling on president bush that this will not stand yet

frequently lost hour collective memories five days after the iraqi invasion with the world come in the country and the majority of his staff of what he would decide that the other options and not only on the table but much occurred behind the scenes between the first and fifth of august lawrence eagleburger war in the endorsement in here today 20 years later as we discussed the gulf war we should be frank of what moved them to act not that it mattered much at all but that the particular brand of evil required a response nor was bush persuaded it carries

concern or iraq would have dangerous weapons of mass destruction. in time his thoughts and actions but not freedom, evil, of human rights are wmd affected his thinking. this is important with the growing realization he stood at a pivotal moment this is my second point* for the evening. is explained in the national security council meeting, my first of judgment is such that to accommodate iraq should not be a policy option there is too much steak quote. in there was at a far it

intimate setting -- sending wear regular air force one was too large to land in scowcroft knows this story the borders mattered we have to picture the president and his aides so tight together the nea is practically touch him papers were on each other's laps and within the cramped space the national security adviser a means for word while making his behalf point* jabbing the fig been there every time it is also grow crops had to make his case for the time of calculation based on their own national interest something more important was out what and eagleburger said womack is the first test as a bipolar world is

relaxed is more flexibility because people may not be worried about the involvement of the super powers is a don -- saddam hussein's exceeds it could be a bad lesson" end quote. from the entanglements in the middle east derived why did bush go against decades of american policy to protect the region? that takes me to my final point* why bush acted and how he reached the decision i argue bush took the dramatic step because he sought it as a bridge to a better world. his world order was not just a catchy phrase the

culmination of long and difficult journey with the national security team -- team that those under gorbachev could be trusted and came to the realization of the cold war was over even after the berlin wall fell in a democracy fluid behind the iron curtain fearing the violent crackdown he witnessed in tenements where. but bush recognized the end of the cold war eliminated the most able aspect since 1945 and time again bush told the leaders their alliance required an enemy to survive is the instability is self united

germany he said the enemy is and predictability and told margaret thatcher if i asked who the enemy is now i tell them empathy and complacency. bush even lost his temper pushing reporters to declare the cold war over because he did not know the answer to the next question what comes next. he said "is the cold war the same? but the berlin blockade? a obsolete not if i see there's no cold war than we do with those troops in europe? come on quote. he saw an opportunity a

chance to demonstrate that washington would continue to lead the matter what the future might bring it promised the reward for service several were to end with united nations free to fill the historic mission of its founders ultimately the division of a new world based on sovereignty is what drove his thinking when saddam hussein invaded kuwait and said the prospect of a global peace continues to depend on american and foreign presence and told corporate -- gerber chough the same thing on the eve of the american air war in the ground war that liberation of kuwait was something bigger and gorbachev attempted to mediate an

first when the ground will war appeared imminent action he called hoping to save lives and his former allies and baghdad and to keep too vivid of the demonstration that america was in power but one could say gorbachev called to badger bush hectoring him with phone calls that would last over two hours and this was not the brightest part of their relationship gorbachev was a knowing the heck out of bush and he was tired and stressed and about to send hundreds of thousands of soldiers into combat risking more civilians in the process and he was frankly tired of gorbachev's calls that at one point* he began

yelling and he did not stop, he yelled and healed and he yelled. is hard to determine from the transcripts with vague are yelling it does not reveal town but in this case may know that bush lost his temper because we can read in the transcript gorbachev saying repeatedly called down, george george, calmed down, calm down, take it easy. [laughter] and his ultimate answer at that moment was revealing there could that be an easy answer just as there could be no easy soviet intervention because at state was the post cold war world with un looked over sovereignty in the soviet

union included and as bush told gorbachev that sums up the entire reason now a full generation ago when they rained down indirectly some lettuce not fallout over i rapport divide ourselves over saddam hussein after all there are far bigger things which will be over very soon. thank you. [applause] civic thank you very much know i will ask two people to join us on stage and

first of all, i would like to have embassador food to -- went to texas a&m is a career foreign service officer was at the time of desert storm was the deputy chief in romania where he received the state department's award for leadership award in next i'd like in the house to join us graduated her texas a&m university 1967 and received rickety of -- regular army commission to deputy commander commanded the

22nd brigade and the first calvary division and executed the plan again said tom hussain making bloody incursion prior to the start of the operation these actions to see the iraqis could attack the south in the vicinity. we look forward to this discussion we have people who were there and people who studied what happened there. let's go into the desert. >> i believe we are waiting for your questions if you don't ask the question i will tell you about all the things coming out of the archive.

>> i don't have a chart but we have many arguments that i use this now when i teach about said goal for and talk about operation iraqi freedom and one of the differences between both wars is i wonder with your interpretation that president bush had a vision we have a free hand in the middle east but we also set precedents how we should do business and in order to maintain the coalition does that play out? is there a definite decision you can only do so much with so many allies? >> i am curious to hear what our panelists has to say.

think it was constrained and also to my mind the interest to go to war but clearly he was constrained by the concern of the israeli arab dynamic, israel is not a member of the coalition but shall we say we're not fond of the israelis? consequently he was constrained to keep the war from going on long enough for them to retaliate and at the same time with the desire for the arab solution he was concerned if you went further to baghdad and opposed by force it would create greater enemy that would be viewed from western

colonialism but a distinction there revelation to me that there is so is bennett question when the decision comes up about american forces should have continued on to baghdad. for very important reason the ultimate goals beyond the liberation of kuwait was the removal of saddam hussein from power. there was a 100 percent certainty that this would happen in any way. said on hussain embarrassed his own people, his own army 999 times out of 1,000 that is how things would have

paid out that -- played out that he would not have survived the from the perspective of george h. w. bush of a key role deadeyes and made it but given the question and the odds i think they would take the same that. >> a distinct the brass of the coalition did play a role in the calculation my vantage point* was remaining were only a few months before to be overthrown deal the violent one overthrown in eastern europe after the fall of though wall. cliff a big ally of saddam hussein and iran.

and these successors many came out of the communist party, not the associate but a communist. why was arabia important? that had and a rotating seat on the security council in a they had a vote it needed nine votes. we really needed this part of romania even though they did not like what they we're doing so keeping a coalition that brought did have something to say. >> i was a colonel at the time while the discussion

was going on i was running off tackle at the fundamental level. said two years before, i had been on the joint staff band the executive director of three joint chiefs of staff and was there for the first six months. fill holes saying at the time, we were this close to the commander in chief of being an admiral, it went down and was between two as restorers between sports cough and then they the three-star admiral because at the time was all about the tinker wars so there was

no thought there was no war plan. there was no contingency plan to 1021 was all about the soviet union so the thought of a ground war in that region at this time even to a colonel with see it -- unbelievably remote. >> might question is ambassador and general house, are you buying the of kool-aid this man is dishing

out? he reminded us from the very beginning of his talk that george herbert walker bush being careful and cautious political leader then he tells us that he had a vision for a new world order in willing to risk an enormous amount because he saw the stakes were so much bigger than saddam hussein. general house? did we expect saddam hussein to use chemical weapons? what we're estimates about casualty's kid you believe we were ready to throw the dice polisher understanding for whom this library is

constructed? >> you answer. [laughter] >> can i interject. >> let the kool-aid defend itself. >> if all only one of us agrees i go to the hall of fame. [laughter] >> i am part lee persuaded to buy the argument and not withstanding president bush reputation for prudence he also did have a broader vision to look after his administration. and i do think the iraqi use of force violated the notion

to those the cold war world might look like. i do think there were other objectives very much concerned with a huge stake seeming to be called into question by the invasion. a messenger that saddam hussein's controlling that part of the world's supply that might make a difference who controls that spee get. and also persuaded that this set of events not completely unraveled to validate everything he invested, and to reconsider but he had

come to invest something in this relationship. and finally once and for all end the cold war. there were many objectives they saw in the diplomacy of the first persian in goal for but i released persuaded that part of his calculation was something had to come at a this he had a way to answer the question what comes next the international coalition that would be strong enough to turn back aggression and a critical nature.

>> the context you lose after what happened is after we had gotten out of vietnam we were involved in day island fight that wasn't much involved in just cause taking down noriega in panama. when i got to the gulf september of '90 to defend saudi arabia, as a matter of fact in the october we had plans to build camps like in germany. while all this was going on

in washington and never saw a tv ad out there in the desert nobody has been there since jesus christ. [laughter] no camels, and know nothing. no trails, no roads or no towns. and us just sitting there like we had. so we started to lay out plans to build camps for ranges and just had to understand the context of my level after vietnam to to rezaiyeh lived through 20 years of how bad it was to be a soldier because we have

done these terrible things in vietnam's. real menu when we went to the gulf war we were so good the reagan dollars i remember being asked the groups that came to talk to me, did you know, where the enemy was? i said i didn't care i just wanted to do with the friendlies where i could be any enemy. so the context at the time was lost but we have never

seen any of these briefings. >> we did not know until sometime in december all land we were defending saudi arabia. in addition to the offensive for planning that not at my level. so it is not quite understanding what is going on in your occur know it is hard to a mention in the president of the united

states mine to. [laughter] i just ran off guard and ran off tackle. [laughter] >> with your thoughts on the revolution in military affairs ic the kool-aid that may be president bush wanted to maintain stability with tenements where there is no danger to the outside reid gin if you will. i am skeptical of the revolution so not even a colonel just to see things as capabilities the communication capabilities

certainly in this conflict would be astronomical and i'm sure the general can speak to that i am wondering what your thoughts are with respect to said gulf war planning from the beginning and whether not you think this is a revolution of military affairs. >> no. i don't. the first is the have a lot of memories that are bad and terrible things. the vascular you had for lunch you would get a wrong if you so. >> guest: tv 22 years ago you'll remember over the last 22 years but not 22 years ago but one thing that was flashed was remarkable images hitting on exactly

what we wanted, to points, a first that is quite impressive something that is clearly impressive but the second two points the pentagon did not show you any video the percentage of footprints that were smart well infinitely more than what the iraqis had was small compared to the impression the pentagon gave we're the only showed pictures, that was a tiny percentage. so i don't think this was a revolution as you pointed out just how proficient united states was in waging

war with a less proficient adversary. in the more philosophical and fundamental way that the ultimate goal of the conflict was a political goal so the military planning with the air war were designed with a traditional military conclusion which in truth was not revolutionary at all so i cannot see it in revolutionary affairs i do see we're running at a time by one to give him a chance to comment. >> as i alluded to the revolutionary of military affairs the something that

came at the time goldwater nichols was passed to join the military and was all that was talked about back in the '80s and what it meant to me is finally, coming at a vietnam , we had thinkers in the military said said it worked through what it takes to wage war act of very high level using all the tools in the toolbox. navy, air force marines come a wide you have for airforce because we need them.

the marines, nav, and marines, the airforce. [laughter] but when you're fighting you picked tools out of the tool box for what we received ha from the american taxpayers were unbelievable tools but still they would be understood all that was their combination of hardware, and believable training that occurred, all the things that went to begin if you worry about the enemy, no i just worry about my buddies i did not want to shoot my own guys.

>> one more question. >> accepting the argument the bush policy is governed in the precedents set, that with the question that they do show up on the battlefield as a possibility in south france at the time there was fear he had missiles he could not unveil yet to hit mediterranean targets. so do the set precedents once they're in the conversation at these

diplomatic moves that they had released chemicals and we knew that. anybody could have retaliated with chemical weapons. there are so many levels for all you could that's here, thank you for coming, the levels of interaction today has been unbelievable, what the president was thinking about, what he was doing, the levels, then i was just out there at the end tell me what to do boss. [laughter] >> i will jump in as the

boss and thank you very much. [applause] >> i happen to be on the trip you saw highlighted with the president and mrs. bush went to saudi arabia to see the troops and the white house staff was trained to use gas masks to put on clothing so we were very concerned about the use of chemicals and very bad things but with that you would have good things if you would join us outside we have refreshments and you'll have a chance to buy the book and have an autographed cover thank you for coming we're proud of the bush school and to be a part of the texas a&m community and i will remind you of things

that texas a&m center around excellence comet integrity, loyalty, respect and selfless service all personified with george h. debut bush and we're honored to be here. thank you. [applause] >> 10 things congress doesn't want you to know about how does business. number four, powerful members of congress saved noncompetitive seats hold fund-raisers outside of districts to increase leverage over other members. number five congress congress spends more than $100 billion every year on over 200 programs not authorized by law. number six, congress

routinely raids social security trust fund to cover general revenue shortfalls. >> if you look at the appropriation bills because of the political dynamic, and you go into say we appropriate x amount of money then look at how many programs it is over $350 billion of programs funded better not authorized by congress which tells you there is the imbalance of congress, how do we appropriate funds for programs they have not said we should spend money on and issues you the power of the appropriations committee and benefits going back to the states of what is most important visit to look good in oklahoma by the many i direct their or tousing long

term what is the health of the country in the long run and how we make those decisions? that puts you on the losing side of every argument but you have to work hard to explain yourself. >> host: number seven, members of congress frequently do not have the opportunity to read the bills they're voting on. number eight, one of the more secret anti-democratic ways congress spends is to use language only the members of the committee can photon or a mint. number nine come each year congress spends countless hours debating a budget resolution it has no intention of keeping. number 10, congress circumvents its own budget limits and avoids public scrutiny by exploiting its own arcane budget procedures >> those are all true.

>> host: in the budget resolution we are about to begin that season in february, is a waste of time? >> no. it isn't if right now we have a of three point* $6 trillion spending, the big criticism of the last two years is congress is gridlock. really? how did we authorize spending three point* $6 trillion? we are gridlock to spending money we don't have on things that are not absolutely necessary. we are gridlocked so we can make ourselves look good to our constituencies. there is no gridlock with spending your kid's future in washington we would not have spent three point* 6 trillion if we had a budget last year but we did a continuing resolution that passed that means it is

bipartisan and we borrowed 1.2 trillion dollars we didn't have coverage of wicked than 600 billion was wasted, literally did no benefit directly for the assistance of -- citizens of this country other than to a minister or develop or give out for programs. in a want you could look and say every program stand-up this is effective and efficient and it is no. because members have not oversight ordered done their job then they turn a blind eye to say it is started resizable get criticized when they do so therefore latigo. it goes back so now with

that cr last year $350 billion worth of programs were appropriated money that have never been authorized by congress or the authorization has lapsed. that means the authorizing committees are working because if we appropriate minute -- many then why not have it authorized and have them put it into one. you can ignore your own rules. >>, a chair is there among the commanders of congress of their constituents of criticism to not be reelected? >> it runs the gamut that you need to look and a larger perspective, i was a businessman long before i was a position, i built the business and became a physician as an older

individual, i was known as grandpa in my medical school class it -- class and practiced 25 years. my goal was to be a physician i was not at the risk other than refutation with my patients. if you put it in context it depends of the goal of the house of representatives. if the goal is to fix the problems in the country to create as good a of a future that we have had and if that goal is above your personal goal to get in the office that has notoriety and power and position, you will do fine to keep that fear in perspective, when your number one goal is the

notoriety, and the secondary goal is to secure the future, what happens is how you value your position on certain policy changes, that is not and tear or terrible be human nature. so i save your ever-growing to solve the problem were secure liberty and freedoms freedoms, you have to send to politicians. >> host: did you get any hostile reaction from your colleagues from this book? >> i don't think many have read the debt bomb but i am sitting here talking to you and i make speeches and i do

it on the floor. i'm okayed to take a the criticism of my colleagues if i think our country is in trouble, it is. we're bankrupting. there's a great article, if you take general accepted accounting principles that c-span has to operate under, most county governments, right now with $88 trillion of things we have to pay for we have no idea where to get the money over 75 years. 88 trillion that is one point* trillion dollars of bills coming due than what we have over the next 75 years. if you didn't grow the economy of all, why have we put yourself in that position? the fact is now the federal

reserve has increased the balance sheet and has created to a trillion dollars of phony money and ultimately that pain will fall on the middle-class and the very pork and will defeat of both parties say they want, yet we don't have the courage to day to make the tough choices even if it means we lose our seats to secure the future of this country. we put ourselves first instead of the country first. is not hard if the american citizenry its black and white, go to the web site, there are common-sense ways to save money. just this last week tear force announced, this year we will spend $64 billion on a mighty projects.

64 billion. the gao says at least half of that will be wasted on information and technology projects. we had a program that said you should cancel this. because it will never work. here is out inefficient government is last week the airforce canceled finally after spending another $100 million they paid the settlement fee of $8 million to cancel that the person that was responsible for the contract did not get fired and not held accountable and the company that did not provide the service did not get sued to get our money back. nobody runs their household that way. most state governments don't

but we're totally incompetent when it comes to spending taxpayer money. why do we wasted $32 billion per year on at i t programs that don't work? that is 60 percent of what they want to take out of the pentagon. why do we do that? with the leadership to say we get this stopped? we have a special committee to look at this, oversight would get the bad actors we will demand the people who make those decisions get fired and company's nonperforming pay the money back. none of that happens. you can defraud the federal government, not performing a contract and do it with impunity because members of congress are basically not willing or inexperienced to not know you could hold people accountable for